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THE END OF CLASS ACTIONS?
Brian T. Fitzpatrick*
In this Article, I give a status report on the life expectancy of class action litigation
following the Supreme Court's decisions in Concepcion and American Express.
These decisions permitted corporations to opt out of class action liability through
the use of arbitration clauses, and many commentators, myself included, predicted
that they would eventually lead us down a road where class actions against
businesses would be all but eliminated. Enough time has now passed to make an
assessment of whether these predictions are coming to fruition. I find that,
although there is not yet solid evidence that businesses have flocked to class action
waivers and that one big category of class action plaintiffs (shareholders) remain
insulated from Concepcion and American Express altogether I still see every
reason to believe that businesses will eventually be able to eliminate virtually all
class actions that are brought against them, including those brought by
shareholders.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TR O D U C TIO N ..................................................................................................... 16 2
I. Ti-E CONCEPCION AND AMERICAN EXPRESS DECISIONS ...................................... 163
II. Ti-E END OF CLASS A CTIONS? ................................ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
A. Do Businesses Have the Opportunity to Ask All of the People Who
Currently Sue Them in Class Actions to Agree to Pre-Dispute Contractual
T erm s? ................................................... .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  17 5
B. Is There Anything Left in the Law that Can Stop Businesses from Including
in Their Pre-Dispute Contractual Terms Arbitration Clauses with Class
A ctio n W aivers? ........................................... . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17 9
1. A rbitration C lauses ................................................................................. 179
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. J.D., Harvard Law
School, 2000. I am grateful to insightful comments from Lisa Bressman, Erin O'Hara
O'Connor, Amanda Rose, and Randall Thomas, as well as from participants at the Michigan
Journal of Law Reform's 2013 Symposium on Class Action Reform and the ILEP 20th
Annual Symposium on Business Litigation and Regulatory Agency Review in the Era of the
Roberts Court. I am also grateful for helpful research assistance from Matt Downer, Kayla
Duffey, Matt Ginther, Dan Kay, and Will Marks.
162 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:1
2. Em bedded Class Action W aivers ........................................................... 185
a . S tate L aw ........................................................................................... 18 5
b . F ed eral L aw ....................................................................................... 18 8
C. Will Businesses Take Advantage of the Opportunity? ............................... 190
III. W HERE Do W E Go FROM HERE? ................................................................... 193
C O N C LU SIO N ........................................................................................................ 19 9
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of October 9, 2011, the day the Supreme Court heard
arguments in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion,' I published an opinion piece
in the San Francisco Chronicle that made the following predictions: (1) the
Supreme Court would enforce the class action waiver AT&T placed into its
arbitration agreements; and (2) doing so would start us down a path where class
actions against businesses would be all but eliminated. 2 As we know, the Supreme
Court enforced AT&T's class action waiver3 (and, indeed, doubled down on the
1. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
2. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Op-Ed., Supreme Court Case Could End Class-
Action Suits, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2010, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/ Supreme-
Court-case-could-end-class-action-suits-3246898.php.
3. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation
in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 623, 627 (2012) ("The
coup de grace administered to consumer class actions [was] by a 5-4 Supreme Court this
past term in AT&T Mobility L.L. C. v. Concepcion. All of the doctrinal developments of
recent years circumscribing the reach of class actions pale in import next to [Concepcion 's]
game-changing edict .. "); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v.
Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REv. 703, 707 (2012) ("The reasoning of
the majority's opinion in Concepcion is vulnerable to attack on various grounds .... [I]t
would in some ways be fun to join the attacks on the majority's analysis ...."); Maureen A.
Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration after Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REv. 767, 791
(2012) ("That the FAA, enacted in 1925, authorizes private parties to eliminate class and
representative actions hardly seems plausible. Yet, the Supreme Court's decision in
Concepcion suggests just that .... Just as Concepcion may be the death knell of arbitral
class actions, it may also infect other areas of state legislation and governance."); Arthur H.
Bryant, Op., Class Actions Are Not Yet Dead, 33 NAT'L L.J., no. 42, June 20, 2011, at 46
("The U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in AT&T v. Concepcion is a disturbing example of
judicial activism that makes it easier for corporations to enforce mandatory arbitration
clauses banning class actions, cheat consumers and workers out of millions and keep almost
all of the money."); Editorial, Gutting Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26
("The Supreme Court's 5-to-4 vote in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion is a devastating blow
to consumer rights."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., Supreme Court: Class (Action)
Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2011, at All ("The effect of the Supreme Court's decision
is to make it far less likely that corporations engaged in even massive fraud will be held
accountable when many people lose a little."); David Schwartz, Do-It-Yourself Tort Reform:
How the Supreme Court Quietly Killed the Class Action, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 16, 2011,
10:52 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/do-it-yourself-tort-reform-how-the-
supreme-court-quietly-killed-the-class-action/ ("Concepcion is the culmination of twenty-
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enforcement of class action waivers two years ago in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant4 ). But did it start us down a path that will lead to the end
of class actions against businesses? Many other scholars have shared my fear that
it would,5 but only now has enough time passed that it is possible to make an
assessment of whether our fears are coming to fruition. In this Article, I try to
undertake this assessment. I find that, although there is not yet solid evidence that
businesses have flocked to class action waivers-and that one big category of class
action plaintiffs (shareholders) remain insulated from Concepcion altogether-I
still see every reason to believe that businesses will eventually be able to eliminate
virtually all class actions that are brought against them, including those brought by
shareholders.
In Part I of this Article, I briefly recount the Supreme Court's decisions in
Concepcion and American Express. In Part II, I explain the premises behind my
prediction regarding the future of class actions and assess how those premises have
fared thus far. In Part III, I assess what, if anything, might be done about all this,
and, in the Conclusion, I offer a few parting thoughts.
I. THE CONCEPCIONAND AMERICANEXPRESS DECISIONS
The Concepcion and American Express decisions rested on an
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), so it is worth starting there.
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to override judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that obligated parties to forgo recourse to courts of law for any future
claims that might arise between them.6 The Act renders "valid, irrevocable, and
five years of Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence that has turned the FAA into a do-it-
yourself tort reform statute.").
4. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3 ("[T]he Supreme Court's ruling
suggests that many-indeed, most-of the companies that touch consumers' day-to-day
lives can and will now place themselves beyond the reach of aggregate litigation. These
companies include telephone companies, internet service providers, credit card issuers,
payday lenders, mortgage lenders, health clubs, nursing homes, retail banks, investment
banks, mutual funds, and the sellers of all manner of goods and services. And that is just
consumers. Employees, too, will find themselves unable to band together and seek legal
redress."); Sternlight, supra note 3, at 704 ("The U.S. Supreme Court's five-to-four decision
in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion is proving to be a tsunami that is wiping out
existing and potential consumer and employment class actions."); Weston, supra note 3, at
767 ("In AT&T Mobility L.L. C. v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court potentially allowed for
the evisceration of class arbitration, and indeed most class actions, in consumer and
employment settings .... ").
6. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 n.6 (1985)
("The House Report accompanying the [Federal Arbitration] Act makes clear that its
purpose was to place an arbitration agreement 'upon the same footing as other contracts,
where it belongs' ... and to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitrate." (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)). See also Julius Henry
Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 283
(1926) ("[I]n our English system of jurisprudence ... there has been an established
rule... that parties might not, by their [arbitration] agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the
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enforceable" any "written provision ... to settle [a controversy] by arbitration"
subject to one exception: "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."7 Under the FAA, courts cannot overturn decisions
rendered by arbitrators, except in the narrowest of circumstances.8 Although it
appears the Act was intended to operate in only a small corner of the economy, this
history has been lost and the Act now roams freely.9 As a result, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements have become a routine part of the commercial world.
Businesses insist on these agreements in their contracts with their customers, in
their contracts with employees, and in their contracts with other businesses. 10
courts. This rule was so firmly established that our American courts did not feel themselves
free to change the rule, but declared it to be the duty of the legislature to make this
change.").
7. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
8. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (listing as the bases for vacating an arbitration
judgment: "an award.., procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," "evident partiality
or corruption in the arbitrators," "misconduct... or other misbehavior [of the arbitrators] by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced," and "where the arbitrators exceeded
their powers"). The last ground is the most commonly invoked by parties seeking to vacate
an award. See Andrew M. Campbell, Construction and Application of§ IO(a)(4) of Federal
Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.A. § 1O(a)(4)) Providing for Vacating of Arbitration Awards
Where Arbitrators Exceed or Imperfectly Execute Powers, 136 A.L.R. FED. 183 (1997)
("[M]ore awards have been vacated on this ground than under all the other reasons for
vacating awards combined."). But the Supreme Court has held it is available "only when
[an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively
'dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice ....' Major League Baseball Players Ass'n
v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).
9. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
UMKC L. REV. 449, 467 (1996) ("The unrebutted legislative history created prior to the
FAA's passage establishes that only disputes arising out of commercial contracts were to be
arbitrable; no agreements to arbitrate employment disputes in any industry were to be
included. The decision to exclude noncommercial agreements from the scope of the Act
makes sense because the FAA's underlying purpose was to promote arbitration in the
commercial setting."); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme
Court Created A Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 99, 106 (2006) C[T]he central concept behind the [Federal Arbitration] Act: to
provide for enforceability of arbitration agreements between merchants-parties presumed
to be of approximately equal bargaining strength-who needed a way to resolve their
disputes expeditiously and inexpensively... The hearings make clear that the focus of the
Act was merchant-to-merchant arbitrations, never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations. All of
the examples given by Bernheimer as to cases he knew about or cases he had personally
been involved with through the New York Chamber of Commerce were cases between
merchants." (citing Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and
H.. 646 Before the J. Comm. Of Subcomms. On the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 5-9 (1924))).
10. See Theodore Eisenburg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 871, 882-83 (2008) ("Over 75 % of the consumer agreements we examined
included mandatory arbitration clauses .... Over 90% of the ... employment agreements
included arbitration clauses."); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv.
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Historically, pre-dispute arbitration has been attractive to businesses
because they can design arbitration proceedings with different procedural rules
than those that exist in courts." Businesses fear the unpredictability of juries in
courts; thus, arbitration is more attractive because they can specify that any
arbitrated cases will be submitted to professional arbitrators rather than
laypersons. 12 Businesses fear the time and expense of discovery in courts; 13 thus,
they can specify that any cases in arbitration will enjoy informal and streamlined
exchanges of information. 14
437, 439 (2011) ("Arbitration clauses appear in hundreds of millions of consumer and
employment contracts."). There is disagreement over how prevalent mandatory arbitration
clauses are in business-to-business contracts. Compare Theodore Eisenburg et al., supra
(finding arbitration clauses in 6.1% of sampled business-to-business contracts), with
Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (Or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 433, 467 (2010) ("[T]here are strong
reasons to believe that [the Eisenburg et al.] sample is not representative of business-to-
business contracts as a whole. Their study is a useful reminder that arbitration clauses are
not widely used in material contracts, what one might call 'extraordinary' contracts between
businesses. But their study simply does not speak to the frequency with which arbitration
clauses are used in ordinary contracts between businesses.").
11. See STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.3(c) (2001)
("Not only does the parties' contract determine whether a dispute goes to arbitration, the
contract also determines what occurs during arbitration .... [T]he rules of procedure and
evidence in arbitration are, with few exceptions, whatever the contract says they are.
Arbitration agreements commonly provide for less discovery and motion practice than is
typical of litigation and commonly provide for fewer rules of evidence .... Arbitration
privatizes procedural law by allowing parties to create their own customized rules .... ");
see also JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 1.1 (3d ed. 2005) ("Interest in
alternative dispute resolution is fueled by a number of motives [including] ... [c]reating
better processes that are more open, flexible and responsive to the unique needs of the
participants.").
12. See Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and
Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Reconciliation, 77 B.U.
L. REv. 687, 774-75 (1997) ([I]mportant procedural rights are waived by an agreement to
arbitrate. The first is trial by jury. An arbitration agreement vests the arbitrator with full
authority to decide all issues of fact, law, and damages. Employers generally favor this
transfer of authority because they perceive juries as being less predictable than judges or
arbitrators."); Christopher A. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
695, 709 (2001) ("One consequence of the parties' selection of expert arbitrators is that the
case will not be tried by a jury .... [T]his is cited as an advantage of arbitration from the
corporation's viewpoint .. ").
13. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-61 (2007) ("[T]he
threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious [business] defendants to settle even
anemic cases .... ").
14. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)
("Although [arbitration discovery] procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal
courts, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration."'); see also Jean
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1641
n.51 (2005) ("The typical arbitration clause leaves the extent of discovery in part to the
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Businesses also fear class actions. 1" The question in Concepcion was
whether the class action device is one of the procedures that businesses can change
in arbitration.16 AT&T wrote an arbitration agreement that required its customers
to pursue their claims on their own; they could not join a class action. 17 But a class
action waiver is a different sort of "procedural" change than, for example, a jury-
trial waiver or a full-discovery waiver: without the class action device, many
plaintiffs-i.e., those with small claims-will be unable to pursue their claims at
all.' 8 That is, in many cases, a class action waiver is not only a change in
procedure, but also a change in liability: businesses can escape all accountability
for causing small harms if they can escape class actions. To be sure, changes in
other procedures might also be seen as changes in liability. I suspect moving from
juries to professional arbitrators reduces not only the variance of awards against
businesses but the mean sum awarded as well.'9 Nonetheless, even if the difference
is only a matter of degree rather than kind, the difference in degree is a dramatic
one: with class action waivers, businesses can reduce their liability for small-stakes
injuries to something very near zero. For this reason, state courts in California had
declared class action waivers unconscionable when they involved parties with
small claims.20
discretion of the arbitrator, but it is well recognized that less discovery is usually available
in arbitration than in litigation.").
15. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and
Their Fee Awards, 7. J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 811-12 (2010) ("Class actions have
been the result of great controversy in the United States. Corporations fear them.
Policymakers have tried to corral them. Commentators and scholars have suggested
countless ways to reform them."); see also Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce to
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 53 (Dec. 11, 2013), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/files/2013/12/mayerbrown-chamberletter.pdf.
16. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
17. Id. at 1744 ("The contract provided for arbitration... but required that
claims be brought in the parties 'individual capacities, and not as a plaintiff or class member
in any purported class or representative proceeding."').
18. See, e.g., id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("What rational lawyer would
have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees
stemming from a $30.22 claim?"); Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th
Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) ("The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million
individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.").
19. See Stuart H. Bompey & Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later: A Look at
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims After Gilmer v. Interstate
Johnson Lane Corp., 21 EMP. REL. L.J., no. 2, 1995, at 21 ("[T]he size of damage awards in
arbitrations tends to be smaller than in jury trials."); David S. Schwarz, Enforcing Small
Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 60 (1997) ("While the jury is probably still
out on this issue, there is a general perception that arbitrators give smaller awards than
juries. Arbitrators may be more jaded, and hence make lower awards, particularly in more
egregious cases where punitive damages are available.").
20. See Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) ("[W]hen
the [class action] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,
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This was the setting when the Concepcions brought their state law
consumer-fraud claim as a class action in federal court. They claimed that AT&T
had wrongly charged them the sales tax ($30.22) on a phone that AT&T had said
would be "free."'2 ' AT&T moved to dismiss the suit and compel arbitration
because the Concepcions had signed a contract agreeing to arbitrate any disputes
and to do so without joining a class action. 22 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
permitted the suit to go forward because they thought the class action waiver in
AT&T's arbitration agreement was unconscionable under California law.
23
Although, as I noted, the FAA renders any arbitration agreement "enforceable,"
because unconscionability is a basis for invalidating any contract, these courts
found that the case fell within FAA's exception for "such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract. '24 The courts noted that this was
true of the unconscionability defense not only at a high level of abstraction but also
with regard to the specific application of it against class action waivers: under
California law, any contract that waived class actions for small-stakes claims
would be unconscionable, whether it involved arbitration or not.
25
In a 5-4 vote that divided along familiar ideological lines, the Supreme
Court reversed. 26 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, held that the
FAA preempted California's unconscionability doctrine. 27 Although the Court
acknowledged California's law was facially neutral between arbitration and other
contracts, 28 the Court thought the doctrine would nonetheless frustrate the
and... the party with the superior bargaining power has [allegedly] carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money,
then ... the waiver... [is] unconscionable under California law and should not be
enforced.").
21. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
22. See id. at 1744-45.
23. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05-cv-1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) ("In balancing the relative procedural and substantive
unconscionability of the revised arbitration provision, Plaintiffs have met their burden of
establishing that the provision is unconscionable as applied to them under California law."),
aff'd, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Because all three prongs of the Discover Bank
test are met, AT&T's class action waiver is unconscionable under California law.").
24. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *7 ("Generally applicable contract defenses
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening Section 2 of the FAA."), aff'd, 584 F.3d at 857-59.
25. See Laster, 584 F.3d at 857 ("AT&T contends the Discover Bank
rule... [is] applicable only to arbitration agreements. This contention is incorrect ....
'[T]he rule announced in Discover Bank is simply a refinement of the unconscionability
analysis applicable to contracts generally in California. "' (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular
Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007))).
26. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.
27. See id. at 1753.
28. See id. at 1747 ("[T]he inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine
normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here,
unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.").
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purposes of the FAA by discouraging parties from entering into arbitration
agreements.
29
Why did the Court think a doctrine that prohibited class action waivers
both in arbitration agreements and nonarbitration agreements would discourage
parties from entering into arbitration agreements? The Court gave a three-part
answer. First, the Court said that striking class action waivers in arbitration
agreements would force businesses to defend class actions in arbitration
proceedings.3 Second, the Court said that businesses would not want to defend
29. See id. at 1751-53.
30. See id. at 1750 (stating that the Discover Bank rule would lead to "inevitable
class arbitration"). I do not understand why Justice Scalia thought that striking the class
waiver meant that AT&T would have to defend the class action in arbitration rather than in
court. After all, the Concepcions filed their class action in federal court, and it was AT&T
that sought to compel arbitration. See id. at 1744-45. The lower federal courts denied
AT&T's motion to do so, which kept the class action suit in federal court; had the Supreme
Court affirmed rather than reversed, the suit would have continued to stay there (and AT&T
could have received the robust judicial review of the court system rather than the meager
judicial review of arbitration, contra point two in Justice Scalia's analysis above). I suppose
it might have been possible for the Concepcions to dismiss their case in court and refile it in
arbitration had they prevailed before the Court. Perhaps this is what the Court was worried
about when it said California law "allows any party to a consumer contract to demand
[classwide arbitration] ex post." Id. at 1750. Perhaps California law said that, once a class
action waiver was struck in an arbitration agreement, then the plaintiff could choose
whether to bring his or her class action in court or in arbitration. But if California law said
this, and the Court cited nothing to suggest it did, it would have clearly been preempted by
the FAA. This is the case because just one year earlier, the same five Justices in the majority
in Concepcion decided in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662
(2010), that, unless an arbitration agreement explicitly says class actions are permitted in
arbitration, then the agreement does not permit class actions in arbitration. See id. at 684
([A] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there
is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so."). AT&T's arbitration
agreement, which, if the Concepcions would have won, would have contained only a
stricken clause forbidding class actions, would not satisfy that standard.
But even if Stolt-Nielsen is put to the side and we assume things were as the
Court assumed they were (i.e., once the class waiver was struck, the Concepcions could opt
for a class action in court or in arbitration), there is still no reason to believe that this would
force any business (apart from AT&T in this case and this case only) into a class-wide
arbitration if it would rather face class actions in court. The reason for this is that businesses
are free to write bifurcated arbitration agreements. They can say that, although you must
bring individual claims in arbitration, you can only bring class claims in court. See, e.g.,
Drahozal, supra note 12, at 779 (quoting a provision from Taco John's International, Inc.
Restaurant Franchise Agreement: "if a claim which is subject to arbitration under this
Agreement is properly the subject of a class action, then the party making that claim may, in
its discretion, elect either to assert it as a single-party claim (as opposed to a claim on behalf
of a class) in the arbitration, or to file it as a class action in a court of competent jurisdiction,
pursuant to the laws and rules applicable to that court"). Thus, it is hard to see how
respecting California's unconscionability law would have discouraged a single business to
forgo arbitration altogether for fear of having to defend class actions in arbitration
proceedings.
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class actions in arbitration proceedings.) This was true, the Court thought, both
because class-wide arbitration is less attractive to businesses than individual
arbitration (because it is more formal and slower),3 2 and because class-wide
arbitration is less attractive to businesses than class-wide actions in court: although
the stakes of a class-wide arbitration are as great as they are in court, the judicial
review available, as I noted above, is not.33 Third, for these reasons, the Court said
that, if forced to endure class-wide arbitration, businesses would forgo arbitration
altogether.34 As the Court put it, it is "not reasonably deniable that requiring
In any event, the Court's decision has not been limited to situations where
invalidating the class waiver would lead to class actions in arbitration. Lower courts have
been unconcerned about whether invalidating a class waiver would lead to a class action in
court or arbitration; they have followed Concepcion regardless. See, e.g., Cruz v. Cingular
Wireless, L.L.C., 648 F.3d 1205, 1213 (1lth Cir. 2011) ("[Plaintiffs] claim that Concepcion
was only concerned with state laws that impose nonconsensual class arbitration on parties.
Because [the class action waiver's nonseverability clause] assures that [Defendants] will not
be forced into class arbitration-but only class litigation-they claim that Concepcion is
not implicated here .... Th[is] argument is disposed of easily."); Coneff v. AT&T Corp.,
673 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting attempt to distinguish Concepcion because
"Washington law would.., invalidate the entire arbitration agreement, whereas
Concepcion dealt with a state-law rule that would have forced parties into non-consensual
class-wide arbitration").
31. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (explaining that the "small chance of a
devastating loss" in class arbitration will "pressure [businesses] into settling questionable
claims" because "defendants would [not] bet the company [in class arbitration] with no
effective means of review.").
32. See id. at 1751 ("[T]he switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the
principle advantage of arbitration-its informality-and makes the process slower, more
costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.").
33. See id. at 1752 (relying on the point that, "[i]n contrast [to appeals in
litigation], [the FAA] allows a court to vacate an arbitral award only" in limited, specific
circumstances).
34. See id. at n.8 ("[I]n class-action arbitration huge awards (with limited judicial
review) will be entirely predictable, thus rendering arbitration unattractive."). In the reply to
the opposition to their petition for writ of certiorari, AT&T argued that, even if businesses
would not have to defend class actions in arbitration rather than court, there was another
reason they would abandon arbitration if class waivers were struck: "[b]usinesses would
have little incentive to subsidize [individual] arbitration .. if, at the end of the day, they
still must litigate in court every claim pleaded as a class action." Reply Brief for Petitioner
at 24, AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010
WL 4312794. "[I]nstead, companies will give up on arbitration entirely ...." Id. The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce recently reiterated this same argument. Letter from U.S. Chamber of
Commerce to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 15, at 54-55 ("[A] company that sets
up an arbitration program incurs significant administrative costs .... If faced with the
prospect of... simultaneously dealing with the huge costs of litigating class actions in
court, all rational companies .. would abandon arbitration entirely ...."). But this
argument is hard to square with the substantial majority of businesses that, before
Concepcion, used arbitration agreements without class action waivers. See Drahozal &
Ware, supra note 10, at 472-73 ("Indeed, the substantial majority of cases (190 of 299, or
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consumer disputes to be arbitrated on a [class-wide] basis will have a substantial
deterrent effect on incentives to arbitrate."35 In his dissent, Justice Breyer pointed
out that class action waivers were not just waivers of procedure but, as I noted, for
small-stakes claimants, waivers of substantive liability as well.36 But the Court was
unmoved: "States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA,
even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.
3 7
Concepcion was a preemption decision; in a showdown between state law
and the FAA, the FAA won. But what would happen if the showdown were
between the FAA and another federal law? A federal statute that preserved a right
to proceed in a class action might well trump the FAA. The FAA is an old statute,
and when two federal statutes conflict, the more recent or more specific one can
trump the older or more general one.38 But, as I explain below, there is no federal
statute that preserves the right to proceed in a class action. The only thing that
preserves that right is Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
But what if the mere effectiveness of another federal statute were to be
hampered by a class action waiver? Might the other statute trump the FAA then,
too? Until the American Express decision, this had been the view of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit,39 the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB"),4" as well as many scholars.4' This view was known as the "vindication
64.5%) in the sample [from American Arbitration Association consumer arbitration] did not
arise out of an arbitration clause with a class arbitration waiver.").
35. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at n.8.
36. See id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In California's perfectly rational
view, non-class arbitration over such [small] sums will also sometimes have the effect of
depriving claimants of their claims ....").
37. Id. at 1753 (majority opinion).
38. See, e.g., RadLAX Gateway Hotel, L.L.C. v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct.
2065, 2071 (2012) ("The general/specific canon is perhaps most frequently applied to
statutes in which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific
prohibition or permission. To eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision is construed
as an exception to the general one."); Credit Suisse v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007)
(holding that newer, securities-related statutes had impliedly repealed inconsistent
provisions in older, antitrust-related statutes); Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820,
821 (1976) (A precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.");
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) ("In the absence of some affirmative showing
of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is
when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable."); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342,
363 (1842) ([T]here must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new law,
and those of the old; and even then, the old law is repealed by implication, only pro tanto, to
the extent of the repugnancy.").
39. In re Am. Express Merchants Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012)
("Thus, as the class action waiver in this case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their
statutory rights, we find the arbitration provision unenforceable."), rev 'd, 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013).
40. In re Horton, 357 N.L.R.B., No. 184, Jan. 3, 2012, at *1 ([Wle find that
such an agreement unlawfully restricts employees' Section 7 right to engage in concerted
action for mutual aid or protection, notwithstanding the [FAA], which generally makes
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of rights" theory to evade the FAA,4 2 and it was based on dicta in Supreme Court
decisions which found that various federal statutory causes of action were not
exempt from arbitration because there was nothing in the "text," "legislative
history," or "underlying purposes" of the statutes that "irreconcilably conflict[ed]"
with the FAA.43 The vindication-of-rights theory seized upon the last of these
grounds for conflict-the "underlying purposes"-to contend that, because small-
stakes federal statutory claimants cannot bring their claims without class actions,
those federal statutes would be effectively gutted for such claimants if the FAA
were not overridden.
44
If the FAA said explicitly that "written provisions to settle controversies
by arbitration with class-action waivers" shall be enforceable, then I would have
thought that the vindication-of-rights theory would have been doomed from the
beginning, because it would be hard to see how the mere efficacy of another
employment-related arbitration agreements judicially enforceable."), rev'd, No. 12-60031,
2013 WL 6231617 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013).
41. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 640 ("In the most recent
installment of what is now the Amex trilogy, the Second Circuit made clear that its
conception of the vindication-of-rights doctrine is unaffected by Concepcion. In our view,
the court is correct . . . ").
42. See id. at 640-47.
43. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991)
(Gilmer concedes that nothing in the text of the ADEA or its legislative history explicitly
precludes arbitration. He argues, however, that [it] would be inconsistent with the statutory
framework and purposes of the ADEA... [W]e disagree."); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 221 (1987) ("Nothing in RICO's text or legislative history even
arguably evinces congressional intent to exclude civil RICO claims for treble damages
under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) from the Arbitration Act's dictates. Nor is there any
irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and RICO's underlying purposes."); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) ("We must
assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to
include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be
deducible from text or legislative history.").
44. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 640-47; see also Roger J. Perlstadt,
Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1983, 1995
(2002) ("The treatment of statutory rights is different because of the public interest in the
resolution of disputes over statutory rights-an interest that is separate from private parties'
interest in resolving a dispute between themselves. In order for these rights to be submitted
to arbitration, the arbitration must allow effective vindication of them. Any arbitration of a
statutory claim that did not allow for effective vindication of rights would 'conflict() with
the statute's purpose of both providing individual relief and generally deterring unlawful
conduct through the enforcement of its provisions."'); J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond
Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59
VAND. L. REv. 1735, 1765 (2006) ("[T]he crux of the problem with class action waivers in
the context of negative-value claims is that proceeding with an individual arbitration is
'prohibitively expensive' in light of the small value of the claim. Only through aggregate
procedures can a plaintiff 'effectively vindicate' her individual rights.").
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statute could trump the explicit terms of the FAA.4" But the FAA does not
explicitly say "with class action waivers"; it says only "written provisions to settle
controversies by arbitration' shall be enforceable. The FAA is silent on class
action waivers. Thus, the question posed by the vindication-of-rights theory was
not how to interpret two statutes whose texts conflict with one another, but how to
interpret two statutes whose purposes conflict with one another. How does one
answer that question?
One answer would be to fall back again on the canons that give the edge
to the more recently enacted or more specific statute. Although it is unclear
whether the FAA or a federal statutory cause of action for, say, antitrust or labor
violations is more "specific" than the other, many of the federal statutes on which
class actions are based were enacted more recently than the FAA-including, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act,46 the Americans with Disability Act,47 the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act,48 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 49 the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), 5 ° the Fair Labor Standards Act,5' and the
Securities Acts52-- but some of the most important ones were not, including the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
53
This is not, however, how the Supreme Court answered this question two
years ago in American Express-a case brought under the Sherman Act against
American Express on behalf of merchants that accepted its credit cards. 54 The
merchants' agreement with American Express obligated them to bring any cause
of action against American Express in arbitration, and forbade them from joining a
class action. 55 The merchants argued that this would foreclose them from bringing
45. In fairness, however, I must acknowledge that Supreme Court dicta on the
vindication-of-rights theory had come close to suggesting just that, because, in those cases,
the question was whether the federal statutory cause of action could be arbitrated at all, and
that does seem to be a question which the FAA's text answers explicitly.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2012) (enacted in 1964).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (enacted in 1990).
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012) (enacted in 1974).
49. 29 U.S.C §§ 621-634 (enacted in 1967).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (enacted in 1963).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (enacted in 1938).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (2012) (enacted in 1933).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (enacted in 1890).
54. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013)
("Respondents brought a class action against petitioners for violations of the federal
antitrust laws. According to respondents, American Express used its monopoly power in the
market for charge cards to force merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately
30% higher than the fees for competing credit cards. This tying arrangement, respondents
said, violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.").
55. See id. ("Respondents are merchants who accept American Express cards.
Their agreement with petitioners-American Express and a wholly owned subsidiary-
contains a clause that requires all disputes between the parties to be resolved by arbitration.
The agreement also provides that '[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be
arbitrated on a class action basis. "' (internal citations omitted)).
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a cause of action at all: without the ability to spread the costs of antitrust experts
over a large group of plaintiffs, the merchants' antitrust suit-and perhaps most
every antitrust suit-would not be viable.56 As a result, the merchants argued that
enforcing class action waivers would all but gut the Sherman Act.5
The Court might have done what I suggested above and concluded that
because the FAA postdated the Sherman Act, the efficacy of the FAA trumped the
efficacy of the Sherman Act when the two were drawn into conflict. But the Court
did not do that. Dividing along the same ideological line as in Concepcion (this
time 5-3, with Justice Sotomayor recused), and again with Justice Scalia at the
helm, the Court adopted a broader theory: the mere efficacy of another federal
statute is no match for the efficacy of the FAA. The Court said that only a
"contrary congressional command"-what I take to mean a contrary statutory
text-could override the efficacy of the FAA. 58 In my opinion, all of this seems to
suggest that the FAA is no ordinary statute; rather, it is some sort of super-statute
that is treated differently than its counterparts in the U.S. Code.
II. THE END OF CLASS ACTIONS?
The Concepcion decision stunned many commentators. 59 By the time
American Express was decided, commentators were less surprised.60 As I said, I
56. See id. at 2310 ("Enforcing the waiver of class arbitration bars effective
vindication, respondents contend, because they have no economic incentive to pursue their
antitrust claims individually in arbitration.").
57. See id. at 2316-20 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Italian Colors cannot prevail in
arbitration without an economic analysis defining the relevant markets, establishing Amex's
monopoly power, showing anticompetitive effects, and measuring damages. And that expert
report would cost between several hundred thousand and one million dollars. So the expense
involved in proving the claim in arbitration is ten times what Italian Colors could hope to
gain, even in a best-case scenario.... Amex has put Italian Colors to this choice: Spend
way, way, way more money than your claim is worth, or relinquish your Sherman Act
rights .... [A]rbitration threatens to become ... a mechanism easily made to block the
vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.").
58. See id. at 2309 (upholding class action waiver because "[n]o contrary
congressional command require[d]" otherwise).
59. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration
Fairness Act and The Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. REv.
457,467 (2011) ("The Supreme Court's recent decision in AT&T v. Concepcion ... sounds
the death knell for the class arbitration process .... [T]he Court appears to have placed an
insurmountable obstacle in the path of consumer efforts to vindicate low-value claims.");
Sternlight, supra note 3, at 704 ("It is highly ironic but no less distressing that a case with a
name meaning "conception" should come to signify death for the legal claims of many
potential plaintiffs. The U.S. Supreme Court's five-to-four decision in AT&T Mobility
L.L.C. v. Concepcion is proving to be a tsunami that is wiping out existing and potential
consumer and employment class actions."); Weston, supra note 3, at 794 ("Concepcion,
based on a dated notion of arbitration, improperly guts the FAA savings clause and violates
the reserved role under the FAA for states to hold arbitration contracts to the standards
required for all contracts. Certainly, the FAA was not intended to shield wrongdoers from
liability."); Bryant, supra note 3 ("The U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in AT&T v.
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thought the Supreme Court would decide Concepcion the way it did, and that
doing so would take us down a road that could lead to the end of class actions
against businesses. In this Part, I assess the latter prediction: are class actions
headed for demise? I continue to fear that they very well might be.
My prediction rested on three premises: (1) businesses have the
opportunity to ask all of the people who currently sue them in class actions to
agree to pre-dispute contractual terms; (2) after Concepcion (and certainly after
American Express) there is no longer anything in the law that can stop businesses
from including in those terms arbitration clauses with class action waivers; and (3)
businesses will take advantage of the opportunity and ask all of the people who sue
them to agree to arbitration clauses with class action waivers. Below, I discuss
each of these premises and assess how they have fared in the years since
Concepcion.
Before I do so, however, I should note that, several years before
Concepcion was decided, a very prescient article written by Professor Myriam
Gilles presaged some of my analysis. 6' Her article worried about a clash between
arbitration and class action litigation. 62 In a more recent article written after
Concepcion, Professor Gilles and Gary Friedman reiterated many of her prior
fears, but they ultimately sounded something of a more optimistic note than I do
here. 63 I explain below why I think even Professor Gilles and Mr. Friedman may
underappreciate the full potential of Concepcion.
Concepcion is a disturbing example of judicial activism .. "); Chemerinsky, supra note 3
("This is nothing other than a conservative majority favoring the interests of businesses over
consumers, employees and others suffering injuries."); Gutting Class Actions, supra note 3
("With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Supreme Court reversed that
decision and, in a dramatic example of judicial activism, ruled that class-based arbitrations
also would not be permitted."). I was not stunned by the decision. Shortly before the case
was argued, I published an opinion piece predicting the outcome. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2.
60. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Supreme Court's 2012-2013 Labor and
Employment Law Decisions: The Song Remains the Same, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
157, 158 (2013) ("[I1t was unsurprising that the Court enforced the provision in [American
Express].").
61. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373 (2005).
62. Id. at 377 ("Assuming the collective action waiver emerges more or less
unscathed from the current round of judicial challenges, it is only a matter of time before
these waivers metastasize throughout the body of corporate America and bar the majority of
class actions as we know them.").
63. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 639-40 ("[I]t is clear there are many
cases that class action waivers simply cannot reach. In some ... there is no contractual
relationship between the parties .... In other cases, Congress has evinced a clear intent that
the class action remedy be available. And then there are outlier cases ....").
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A. Do Businesses Have the Opportunity to Ask All of the People Who Currently
Sue Them in Class Actions to Agree to Pre-Dispute Contractual Terms?
In 2010, I published an empirical study that examined all federal court
class action settlements in 2006 and 2007.' The study showed that there are
basically only three groups of plaintiffs who sue businesses in class actions:
consumers of the products of those businesses, employees of those businesses, and
shareholders of those businesses. In particular, over both years in my study, I
found that 17% of all federal class action settlements were suits brought against
businesses by consumers (including fraud and antitrust suits), 23% were suits
brought against businesses by their employees (including labor, employment, and
benefits suits), and 37% were brought against businesses by their shareholders.65
These three categories of suits made up over three-quarters of all federal court
class actions. The remaining quarter of class actions consisted largely of suits
against government actors. 66 In fact, the only appreciable numbers of suits against
businesses not brought by consumers, employees, or shareholders were class
actions brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 67 but these are
relatively insignificant suits for trivial sums of money.
68
My study examined only federal court class actions. It is possible that the
class actions filed against businesses in state court look different than those in
federal court.69 It is true, for example, that there are no securities-fraud class
actions in state court .7 But even if the distribution of class actions against
64. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 15.
65. See id. at 818 tbl. 1.
66. See id. It is possible that Concepcion will affect class actions against
government actors as well, but many of these class actions are brought by persons who are
not in voluntary transactional relationships with the government, such as prisoners.
Moreover, for the same reason governments have voluntarily waived their sovereign
immunity from suit, they may be less inclined to seek class waivers from those who are in
voluntary transactional relationships with them.
67. See id. (showing that these settlements comprised 6% of all class action
settlements in federal court).
68. See id. at 825 tbl. 4 (showing that all of these settlements summed to well
under $10 million per year, a fraction of 1% of the value of all class action settlements in
federal court).
69. Empirical scholars have only begun to study state court class actions and
only in certain subject areas and in certain states. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL.,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FINDINGS OF THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION, 2000-2006: FIRST INTERIM REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf; Robert B. Thompson &
Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 133 (2004); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The
Public and Private Faces of Derivative Suits, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1747 (2004).
70. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 16, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f)(1) (2012) ("No covered class action based upon the ... law of any State... may
be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging ... a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
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businesses is different in state court than in federal court, I have seen nothing to
suggest that the universe of plaintiffs is any different. In short, I strongly suspect
that, whether in state or federal court, almost all of the people who sue businesses
in class actions today fall into the consumer, employee, and shareholder categories.
This is important because one thing that consumers, employees, and
shareholders all have in common is that they are in transactional relationships with
the businesses that they sue. This means, at least in theory, that the businesses they
sue can ask all of these plaintiffs to consent to pre-dispute contractual terms-
including arbitration clauses with class action waivers. This is easiest to see with
regard to employees. At the time of hiring-or, indeed, at any time thereafter-
businesses can (and often do) ask their employees to sign contractual agreements,
including clauses to arbitrate any dispute that might arise.7'
But these sorts of agreements can bind consumers and shareholders, too.
With respect to consumers, in light of advances both in technology and in legal
notions of contract formation, producers of almost any product can now bind
purchasers to contractual language. Even if the purchase is unlike the cell phone
purchase in Concepcion that required consumers to sign a document,72 businesses
can bind consumers to contractual language by placing the language on the
product's packaging.73 Indeed, even if the consumer could not read the language
covered security; or... that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.").
71. See Gilles, supra note 61, at 419-20 ("While arbitration of employment
disputes is nothing new ... the potential for collective action waivers to curtail most, if not
all, employment class actions seeking broad-scale changes in the U.S. workplace is a more
recent phenomenon .... And the newfound ability of employers to notify employees of
arbitration clauses via mass emails will make it far easier to impose these waivers."); see
also Sternlight, supra note 14, at 1641 ("[C]ompanies now commonly impose arbitration
after the relationship has already commenced."). For examples of courts holding that an
adequate post-hire arbitration notice is binding if an at-will employee continues work, see
Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2007); Tinder v.
Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 743 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566,
568-71 (Tex. 2002).
72. Even when the purchase is online and the contractual language appears only
on a computer screen, the language can be binding. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 487
(2002) ("Courts have had little difficulty enforcing standard terms offered in electronic
format."); 15B AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 106 (2014) ("Shrinkwrap or
clickwrap agreements are generally enforceable, unless their terms are objectionable on
grounds applicable to contracts in general, such as illegality or unconscionability.").
73. See Gilles, supra note 61, at 416-17 ("There is nothing, as a matter of
current law, to prevent companies from unilaterally imposing a fully enforceable waiver of
the right to collective action in all manner of consumer transactions .... Consumers buy
goods; goods have packaging; packaging may contain waivers of exposure to collective
actions; therefore, the seller of goods need never be exposed to collective action by
consumers."); James v. McDonald's Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (binding
customer to arbitration clause included in "Monopoly" game's official terms when the fry
carton containing game pieces, among other places, directed customer to read those terms).
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until after he or she purchased the product, many courts have found the language
to be binding.74 This means that even consumers who buy through intermediaries
can be asked to consent to pre-dispute contractual provisions.75 For this reason, I
am not so sure that, as Professor Gilles and Mr. Friedman put it, "consumer cases
stemming from retail purchases" are "cases that class action waivers simply cannot
reach."76
With respect to shareholders, they buy their shares subject to the terms
and provisions found in the corporation's charter and bylaws.77 That is, like
employees and customers, shareholders are in something of a contractual
74. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding software licensing agreement binding despite only being available after opening the
package); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying
ProCD reasoning to standardized consumer contract enclosed in computer box); Mark A.
Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459-60 (2006) ("A majority of courts in the
last ten years have enforced shrinkwrap licenses ...."). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,
104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337-42. (D. Kan. 2000); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc.,
25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230-31 (D. Utah 1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 187
F.R.D. 547 (D. Utah 1999); John E. Murray, Jr., The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract
Formation Theory, 50 DUQ. L. REv. 35, 36 (2012) ("The majority of jurisdictions have not
had the opportunity to decide the fate of the rolling [contract formation] theory [as
explained in ProCD].").
75. See, e.g., Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir.
2014) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement sent by third party to consumer one month
after purchase, but noting that this "could be easily remedied by Toyota" by informing
consumers that it "has a relationship with Sirius XM to provide Toyota customers with a
trial service"); Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-50 (upholding arbitration clause included with
warranty shipped with personal computer); Wilson v. Mike Steven Motors, Inc., 111 P.3d
1076 (Table), No. 92468, 2005 WL 1277948, at *9 (Kan. Ct. App. May 27, 2005)
(upholding arbitration clause car dealer included when consumer purchased an automobile);
Sternlight, supra note 14, at 1638-39 ("Arbitration has even been mandated in connection
with games sponsored by McDonald's hamburger chain and with respect to a mail-in on a
Cheerios cereal box."). Even if many businesses have yet to include arbitration clauses with
simple, everyday retail products (e.g., on the tag of a pair of blue jeans), those clauses
appear to be binding under the "shrinkwrap" rationale from cases such as ProCD. By
analogy, for example, adhesive warranty disclaimers are perfectly legal if conspicuously
placed upon ordinary consumer goods. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2012).
76. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 639.
77. See 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 3:11 (3d ed. 2011) ("The
'charter' .... constitutes a contract between the corporation and the individuals who
become shareholders or members of the corporation .... The future parties to the contract
are the corporation and the persons who become, from time to time, shareholders or
members of the corporation."); Paul Weitzel, The End of Shareholder Litigation: Using
Bylaw or Charter Amendments to Require Binding Arbitration of Shareholder Disputes,
2013 BYU L. REv. 65, 97 ("Every state to address the issue has held that bylaws and
charters are contracts binding upon shareholders .... The major treatises are also
unanimous.").
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relationship with corporations.7" Although there is currently a debate over whether
corporations can unilaterally insert arbitration provisions into their bylaws under
Delaware law,79 there is no barrier under Delaware law to inserting arbitration
provisions into corporate charters with shareholder consent.80 Thus, corporations
have much the same opportunity to bind shareholders to the equivalent of
contractual terms that they do consumers and employees.8 ' In my view, Professor
Gilles and Mr. Friedman underestimate this potential development.8 2
With all of this said, it may be possible for creative lawyers to salvage
some subset of the current system by alleging conspiracies between the businesses
78. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014)
([C]orporate bylaws are 'contracts among a corporation's shareholders"' (quoting Airgas,
Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010))); Boilermakers Local 154
Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013) ("The bylaws of a Delaware
corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the directors, officers, and
stockholders formed within the statutory framework of the DGCL."); Hal S. Scott & Leslie
N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual Arbitration for Stockholder
Disputes, 36 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1187, 1213 (2012) ("[B]y-laws are viewed as
contracts between a corporation and its stockholders."); Randall S. Thomas, What Should
We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation in M&A Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REv. 1925, 1952
(2013) ("Charters are claimed to be contracts .... ").
79. Compare Scott & Silverman, supra note 78, at 1223 ("Corporations could
and should describe the arbitration provision in their by-laws and their effect on present and
future stockholders in their Exchange Act filings."), with Thomas, supra note 78, at 1953
("There are substantive reasons to think that these clauses are unenforceable. The first of
these is the issue of shareholder consent, especially as to management-imposed bylaws.
Director-adopted bylaws do not have express shareholder consent."), and Randall S.
Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and Its
Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 1753, 1814 (2012)
("Should shareholders be bound when directors use their broad powers in corporate law to
insert such a provision into the bylaws without a direct shareholder vote? At present, there
appears to be little support for allowing these bylaws.").
80. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 78 (paraphrasing Delaware's logic as:
"Charters are claimed to be contracts, and forum-selection provisions, in general, are
permissible as a matter of contract law, so these particular types of claims must also be
enforceable.").
81. See Weitzel, supra note 77, at 105 (concluding that shareholders can limit
the "tremendous costs" of shareholder litigation "through an amendment to the charter or
bylaws, which will likely be considered a contract that binds shareholders" and that "[t]he
Federal Arbitration Act will enforce such a provision, and it is unlikely that any defense will
apply"); cf A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The
Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2008 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 217, 248
(2008) (suggesting that "shareholders change the damages measure in Rule 10b-5 securities
fraud class actions" by waiving the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance in the
corporation's articles of incorporation).
82. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 639 n.16 (arguing that under the
current state of affairs, "class action waivers simply cannot reach" "securities fraud cases
based on secondary market purchases" but also noting that "future efforts to embed class
action waivers in IPO registration materials may become more commonplace and less
controversial").
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they wish to sue and some third party to which the plaintiffs have no relationship; I
have seen, for example, consumer-fraud class actions in recent years recast for this
reason as class actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act. 3 It is too early to tell, however, if this workaround will be successful.
B. Is There Anything Left in the Law that Can Stop Businesses from Including
in Their Pre-Dispute Contractual Terms Arbitration Clauses with Class
Action Waivers?
I asserted above that businesses almost always have the opportunity to
ask consumers, employees, and even shareholders, to agree to pre-dispute
contracts terms. Is there anything in the law that would foreclose businesses from
including in these contracts arbitration clauses with class action waivers? In this
Section, I explain why I believe it is unlikely that anything can be found to stop
them. First, it is now clear that pre-dispute arbitration agreements can be enforced
for virtually every cause of action that is brought against businesses in class
actions today except for securities fraud, and it is hard to see how securities fraud
will escape for much longer. Second, after Concepcion and American Express, it is
hard to see how anything in the law can stop class action waivers imbedded in an
otherwise enforceable arbitration clause.
1. Arbitration Clauses
For the first several decades after the enactment of the FAA, the Supreme
Court remained quite skeptical of arbitration provisions in pre-dispute contracts,
and held that any number of claims could not be arbitrated pursuant to such
agreements, especially statutory causes of action. 4 Over the last couple of
83. See, e.g., Manjunath A. Gokare, P.C. v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 2:11-CV-
02131-SHM, 2012 WL 3136668 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 1, 2012); Rajagopalan v. NoteWorld,
L.L.C., 718 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2013).
84. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) ("It is
apparent, therefore, that in a § 1983 action, an arbitration proceeding cannot provide an
adequate substitute for a judicial trial .... We therefore hold that in a § 1983 action, a
federal court should not afford res judicata or collateral-estoppel to effect an award in an
arbitration proceeding brought pursuant to the terms of a collective-bargaining
agreement."); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981)
("Because Congress intended to give individual employees the right to bring their
minimum-wage claims under the [Fair Labor Standards Act] in court, and because these
congressionally granted FLSA rights are best protected in a judicial rather than in an arbitral
formn, we hold that petitioners' claim is not barred by the prior submission of their
grievances to the contractual dispute-resolution procedures."); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 40-41, 51 (1974) (holding that even when an employment
contract contains an arbitration agreement, "there can be no prospective waiver of an
employee's rights under Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act]"); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
438 (1953) (invalidating arbitration agreement for claims arising under the Securities Act of
1933); see also David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication
of Rights Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REv. 723, 731-32 (2012) ("[Lower courts during this
period] invalidated pre-dispute contracts to arbitrate claims under the Patent Act, the
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decades, however, the Court has completely reversed course." The Court is now
very receptive to arbitration,86 and, indeed, many of its own precedents barring
pre-dispute arbitration agreements have been implicitly or even explicitly
overturned. 
8 7
The consequence of this reversal is that, with one very significant
exception, courts have held that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are enforceable
for virtually every claim brought against businesses in modern class actions. What
kinds of claims are these? According to my empirical study, with respect to
consumers, they are largely claims under state law for consumer fraud and under
federal and state law for antitrust violations88 -all of these have been held subject
to pre-dispute arbitration.89 With respect to employees, they are largely claims
under state and federal law for discrimination, wage violations, and hour
violations, as well as under federal law for benefits violations90 all of these, too,
Commodity Exchange Act, the Railway Labor Act (RLA), the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (RICO), and the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act." (internal citations omitted)).
85. See Horton, supra note 84, at 724 ("[T]he Court has nearly concluded its
slow march toward universal arbitrability."); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985) ("[W]e are well past the time when
judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral
tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution."); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 190,
194-95 (D. Mass. 1997) ("Ten years after Gardner Denver, the Supreme Court did an
about face with respect to the competence of an arbitral forum to adjudicate controversies
based on statutory rights, at least with respect to certain statutes.").
86. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 131-32 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Judges in the 19th century disfavored private arbitration. The
[Federal Arbitration] Act was intended to overcome that attitude, but a number of this
Court's cases decided in the last several decades have pushed the pendulum far beyond a
neutral attitude and endorsed a policy that strongly favors private arbitration.").
87. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
485 (1989) (overruling Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427); LaChance v. Ne. Pub., Inc., 965 F. Supp.
177, 179-80 (D. Mass. 1997) ("[Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991)], at least on the surface, appeared to reverse more than a decade's worth of law
which had held that an employee could never be obliged, as a condition of employment, to
waive the right to resort to the federal courts to redress violations of various civil rights
statutes."); Rosenberg, 965 F. Supp. at 195 ("Mitsubishi reversed Gardner Denver's
presumptions .... The FAA, the [Mitsubishi] Court held, created a presumption in favor of
arbitrability; but because a private contract requiring arbitration cannot trump a statute,
courts must still look to the language and legislative intent of the statute at issue to see if the
presumption was rebutted. Mitsubishi placed the onus on plaintiffs to demonstrate a
negative-that Congress intended that the statute preclude arbitration.").
88. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 15, at 818 tbl. 1.
89. See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1741, 1744, 1756
(2011) (state law consumer fraud claims are arbitrable); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628-40
(federal law antitrust claims are arbitrable); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 64-65
(1st Cir. 2006) (state law antitrust claims are arbitrable).
90. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 15, at 818 tbl. 1.
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have been held to be arbitrable.9 It is true that there are a handful of consumer and
employee claims that are still exempt from arbitration per the explicit command of
federal statutes,9 2 but my empirical study found that none of these gives rise to
many class actions.
93
The one very significant exception is claims brought by shareholders
under federal securities laws. No court has ever held these claims to be arbitrable
(though, no court has ever held them unarbitrable), and no company of which I am
aware has taken them to arbitration. This is significant because, as I noted above,
securities-fraud claims brought by shareholders comprise the largest share of class
action suits against businesses today. 94 This is true not only in terms of the number
of suits, but, perhaps more importantly, in terms of the amount of money at stake:
according to my empirical study, the money that changes hands in securities-fraud
suits makes up roughly 75% of all of money that changes hands in federal class
action settlements-including even settlements against nonbusiness defendants.
95
Why have courts never opined on whether securities-fraud claims can be
arbitrated? One reason appears to be that the Securities & Exchange Commission
("SEC") does not like shareholder arbitration, and it has done its best to prevent
companies from inserting arbitration terms into their corporate documents. 96 The
91. See, e.g., 14 PennPlaza L.L.C. v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) ("We hold
that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union
members to arbitrate [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] claims is enforceable as a
matter of federal law."); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (holding that the FAA
preempts state laws permitting wage recovery actions to be litigated in court in the face of
arbitration agreements); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219 (1985) (noting
that "[c]laims involving vacation or overtime pay, work assignment, unfair discharge" are,
"in short, the whole range of disputes traditionally resolved through arbitration .... ");
Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 767 (10th Cir. 2000) ("To date, four circuits have held
that Congress did not intend to prohibit arbitration of statutory [Employment Retirement
Income Security Act] claims .... Having carefully examined the opinions, we agree with
those circuits .... ").
92. Many of these are collected in Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 639 n.77
(referencing 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1)) (residential mortgage loans); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)
(whistleblower claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3), (f)(4) (payday
loans and consumer credit contracts, other than residential mortgages and car loans, entered
into by members of the military or their families); 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (automobile
dealer franchise agreements)). See also National Consumer Law Center, 20 Litigation Areas
Where Consumer Class Actions Remain Viable Despite Concepcion, 29 NCLC REPORTS,
March/April 2011, at 22 n.14, 23 n.27, 24 n.36 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (state insurance
claims under the McCarran-Ferguson Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (claims to utilize federal
substantive rights under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act); 7 U.S.C. § 26(h) & 12 U.S.C.
§ 5567 (whistleblower claims)).
93. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 15, at 818, tbl. 1.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 826, tbl. 4.
96. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Stacy A. Puente, Holding IPOs Hostage to Class
Actions: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in IPOs, 9 SEC. LING. REP., no. 4, Apr. 2012, at 1,
4 ("The mandatory arbitration clause is by no means a novel invention. The [SEC]'s
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SEC has done this in two ways. First, it has refused to exercise its discretion to
grant waivers of unrelated requirements for companies trying to issue initial public
offerings if they have arbitration clauses in their corporate documents.97 Second, it
has permitted publicly traded companies, when sending proxy matters to
shareholders, to leave out any amendments to corporate documents that call for
arbitration.98 For this reason, there are virtually no publicly traded companies that
require their shareholders to arbitrate claims against them.
99
The trouble with the SEC's steadfastness, however, is that it is difficult to
find something in federal securities law that says shareholder claims cannot be
arbitrated. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that claims brought under the very
same provisions of the securities laws can be arbitrated when brought against
brokers.' This is why a number of commentators believe that it is only a matter
established position has been that such clauses were void-particularly where the clause
would limit a shareholder's ability to enforce his or her rights under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, which would violate the prohibition against waiver of rights under Section
29(a) of the Exchange Act." (internal citations omitted)); Christos Ravanides, Arbitration
Clauses in Public Company Charters: An Expansion of the ADR Elysian Fields or A
Descent into Hades?, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 371, 407 (2007) ("The SEC ... has been
shortsightedly insisting on a near ban on experimentation with ADR methods for domestic
companies .... ").
97. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 10, at 462 ("[T]he SEC has opposed the
use of arbitration to resolve disputes between public corporations and shareholders, using its
acceleration power to force the abandonment of a proposed arbitration clause between the
issuer and buyer of securities."); Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors' Claims Against
Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116 (2012)
("In 1990, when a corporation that was planning its initial public offering (IPO) sought to
include an arbitration provision in its governance documents, the SEC staff objected to its
inclusion. In its view, it would be contrary to the public interest to require investors who
want to participate in the nation's equity markets to waive access to a judicial forum for
vindication of federal or state law rights, where such a waiver is made through a corporate
charter rather than through an individual investor's decision.").
98. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal
Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LviG. 1, 8-9 (2012) (noting that the SEC allowed
Pfizer and Gannett to refuse to transmit to their shareholders proposals to amend their
bylaws "to require arbitration of all shareholders' claims, including federal securities
claims").
99. Despite the SEC's resistance, a few companies have managed to list on the
exchanges with shareholder arbitration requirements in their charters. See Ravanides, supra
note 96, at 389 ("A meticulous survey of reports and statements filed with the SEC by U.S.-
listed companies over the last twelve years documents timid signs of a novel trend:
corporations with equity listings on American stock exchanges no longer hesitate to
incorporate in their bylaws or articles of incorporation provisions that mandate resolution by
arbitration of intra-corporate controversies. Despite having opted for arbitration, these,
mostly foreign, companies have been enjoying full access to U.S. equity markets, whereas
the SEC, with few exceptions, has been anything but fiercely defensive of its putative anti-
arbitration policy.").
100. See Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the
Radar, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 802, 825 (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
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of time before the Supreme Court holds that shareholder claims can be arbitrated
as well.' 0'
I suspect these commentators are correct, based not only on the modern
pro-arbitration bent of the Court'0 2 and my reading of federal securities laws, but
also based on the hostility the Court has exhibited over the past couple of decades
to securities-fraud class actions.103 There has been a concerted effort by
conservative scholars to cast doubt on the efficacy of securities-fraud class actions
in recent years,' 4 and I suspect it is beginning to pay off. 10 5 Although securities-
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989)).
101. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Death of Shareholder Litigation?, 34
NAT'L L.J., no. 24, Feb. 13, 2012, at 14 ("Opponents of such provisions must face the sad
fact that the battle has already been lost ...."); Hal Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, The
Alternative to Shareholder Class Actions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2012, at A13; see also Scott
& Silverman, supra note 78, at 1221 ("The Supreme Court's decisions in McMahon and
CompuCredit, which held that arbitration agreements do not violate general statutory anti-
waiver provisions, make the legality of arbitration under the federal securities laws
abundantly clear ...."). But see Black, supra note 100 at 828-32 (attempting to distinguish
the shareholder-broker cases from the shareholder-corporation cases).
102. See Frank Blechschmidt, All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion and the Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 541,
561 (citing the "Court's liberal policy favoring arbitration'); Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall
Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L.
REv. 123, 128-29 (2005) (citing the "pro-arbitration philosophy now embraced by the
Court"); Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage
Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CiN. L. REv. 415, 417 (2003) (citing "the Court's
pro-arbitration ... slant").
103. Jennifer O'Hare, Retail Investor Remedies Under Rule 10B-5, 76 U. CIN. L.
REv. 521, 549 n.144 (2008) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps [v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)] is commonly thought to mark the beginning of a period
of judicial hostility towards securities fraud class actions."); Daniel J. Morrissey, After the
Ball Is Over: Investor Remedies in the Wake of the Dot-Con Crash and Recent Corporate
Scandals, 83 NEB. L. REV. 732, 739-41 (2005) (detailing the Supreme Court's growing
hostility toward securities-fraud class actions between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s).
104. See Pritchard, supra note 81, at 225-26 (discussing the perverse incentives
for plaintiff-shareholders to sue whenever stock prices drop, even absent any evidence of
fraud, and the enormous costs-including risk of bankruptcy-these suits impose on
defendant-companies); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class-Action: An
Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1534 (2006)
("Securities class actions impose enormous penalties, but they achieve little compensation
and only limited deterrence. This is because of a basic circularity underlying the securities
class action: When damages are imposed on the corporation, they essentially fall on
diversified shareholders, thereby producing mainly pocket-shifting wealth transfers among
shareholders."); Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth
Through Reform of the Securities Class Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an
Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 607, 610 (2010) ("The current system
of securities class-action litigation is an inefficient means to redress the harm to
investors .... Securities class-action lawsuits are essentially wealth transfers among
shareholders and often are circular in nature. Existing shareholders bear the burden of
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fraud plaintiffs have not lost all of their cases at the Court in recent years, they
certainly have lost the lion's share of them,0 6 and they may very well lose this one
as well when it comes to pass. Indeed, only last year, in Halliburton Co. v. Erica
P. John Fund,0 7 the Court entertained an entirely separate threat to securities-
fraud class actions: whether to jettison the fraud-on-the-market theory set forth in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson. °8 Without the fraud-on-the-market theory, it is difficult to
see how the common issues in a securities-fraud class action can predominate over
the individual issues, a requirement for class certification.109 Although the Court
did not go so far as to overrule Basic, it nonetheless made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to invoke the theory."0 I suspect the Court will not have as much
difficulty merely extending its arbitration precedents to encompass securities-fraud
claims.
compensating aggrieved shareholders, some of whom also may be existing shareholders.");
Howell E. Jackson, Summary of Research Findings on Extra-Territorial Application of
Federal Securities Law, 1743 PLI/CoRP. 1243, 1253-54 (2009) ("Many interviewees cite
U.S. anti-fraud laws.., as a 'top concern' because they are the 'most intrusive' and have
the 'biggest' impact on extraterritorial transactions. What drives foreign firms away from
the U.S. capital markets is not U.S. regulatory compliance but rather the 'fear that listing on
a U.S. exchange exposes the foreign issuer to potentially bankrupting securities liabilities if
its stock price were to decline sharply.' The 'real burden' for foreign private issuers is 'cost
of litigation that we have built into our system with class action suits, shareholder suits' as
well as the 'risk of huge enforcement actions,' both of which are 'deeply frightening' for
foreign management .... As a result, 'the only way foreign companies can protect
themselves from being exposed to costly class action litigation, is to move out of the United
States altogether-and that is what a lot of companies are doing."' (quoting interviews with
various U.S. and U.K. firms)).
105. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and
Conservative Securities Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 933 (2013).
106. Of the 30 securities-fraud actions, both individual and class, that were
decided by the Supreme Court between 1986 and 2011, the defendant won 18 while the
plaintiff or class won only 12.
107. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
108. See id. at 2405 ("The questions presented are whether we should overrule or
modify Basic's presumption of reliance and, if not, whether defendants should nonetheless
be afforded an opportunity in securities class action cases to rebut the presumption at the
class certification stage, by showing a lack of price impact.").
109. See id. at 2416 (" [W]ithout the presumption of reliance, a Rule 10b-5 suit
cannot proceed as a class action: Each plaintiff would have to prove reliance individually,
so common issues would not 'predominate' over individual ones, as required by Rule
23(b)(3)." (internal citations omitted)).
110. See id. at 2417 ("[D]efendants must be afforded an opportunity before class
certification to defeat the presumption through evidence that an alleged misrepresentation
did not actually affect the market price of the stock."); Sam Hananel, Supreme Court Raises
Bar For Securities Class Action Cases, HUFFINGTON POST (June 23, 2014, 4:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/23/supreme-court-halliburton n 5521929.html
("The Supreme Court... made it tougher for investors to join together to sue corporations
for securities fraud, a decision that could curb the number of multimillion-dollar legal
settlements companies pay out each year.").
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2. Embedded Class Action Waivers
If there is nothing in the law to stop pre-dispute arbitration clauses for all
of the causes of action that plaintiffs raise against businesses in class actions, is
there anything in the law to stop class action waivers embedded in those clauses?
After Concepcion and American Express, it is difficult to find anything in either
state or federal law that can do so.1 11
a. State Law
Concepcion seemed to terminate any chance that something in state law
can slow class action waivers. If California's unconscionability doctrine was
preempted by the FAA, why wouldn't any state law that invalidated class waivers
be preempted? 12 Some commentators have argued that perhaps a state law that is
more selective of which class waivers it invalidates could circumvent the FAA,"
3
111. It should be noted that Justice Thomas does not believe that the FAA applies
in state courts, and, unlike Justice Scalia (who also believes this but will follow Supreme
Court precedent otherwise until it is overturned, see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)), Justice Thomas is willing to vote against
an arbitration agreement in any FAA case that comes from a state court. See Allied-Bruce,
513 U.S. at 285-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (same); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 460
(2003) (same); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (same).
Because Justice Thomas cast the deciding vote in Concepcion and American Express, this
means that any class action waiver case that reaches the Supreme Court from a state court
could presumably come out the other way. The problem is that this is only possible in the
Supreme Court. Lower courts have understandably felt compelled to follow the Supreme
Court's precedent that says the FAA applies in state court as well as in federal court, Justice
Thomas's views notwithstanding. See, e.g., Cottonwood Fin., LTD., v. Estes, 810 N.W.2d
852, 856 (Wis. 2012) ("In light of Concepcion, the classwide arbitration waiver in
[defendant's] arbitration agreement is enforceable and is not substantively
unconscionable."); Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 517 (Mo. 2012) (en
banc) ("Pursuant to Concepcion, the trial court clearly erred in finding that [defendant's]
arbitration agreement was unenforceable based on its class waiver."); Wallace v. Ganley
Auto Group, No. 95081, 2011 WL 2434093, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) ("In light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Concepcion, appellants' argument that [appellee's] arbitration
clause is unenforceable because it bans class actions is without merit.").
112. The California Supreme Court has held unenforceable arbitration agreements
that waive the rights of plaintiffs to bring an action under the Private Attorney Generals Act
(something of a quasi-public class action) to redress consumer and employment violations,
see Iskanian v. CLS Trans. L.A., L.L.C., 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014), but federal courts have
disagreed, see, e.g., Lucero v. Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., No. 3:14-cv-01620, 2014 WL
6984220 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2014).
113. See, e.g., Jerett Yan, A Lunatic's Guide to Suing for $30: Class Action
Arbitration, the Federal Arbitration Act and Unconscionability After AT&T v. Concepcion,
32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 551, 558 (2011) ("The Discover Bank rule was a unique
formulation of unconscionability doctrine that is readily distinguishable from the rules used
in most other states. The very feature of the Discover Bank rule that drew the ire of the
Concepcion majority, its breadth, was the rule's most distinguishing feature.").
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but lower courts have not hesitated in extending Concepcion to override the
unconscionability laws of other states." 4 It is hard to argue with these courts.
Under Justice Scalia's reasoning in Concepcion, any state law that invalidated
class waivers would discourage businesses from using arbitration, and, thereby,
frustrate the purposes of the FAA.
The arbitration clause at issue in Concepcion was very generous to small-
stakes claimants." 5 Other commentators have argued that perhaps state laws might
still invalidate arbitration agreements that are less generous. 116 But, again, lower
courts have not hesitated in extending Concepcion to uphold less-generous
arbitration agreements.117 Again, it is hard to argue with these courts. None of the
Court's analysis in Concepcion rested on the generous terms of AT&T's
agreement. Indeed, other than in the fact section of his opinion, Justice Scalia did
not cite these terms until the very end of his decision. Only after explaining that it
was irrelevant under the FAA whether small-stakes claimants have recourse
against businesses outside class actions, the Court noted that things were not quite
114. See, e.g., Wallace, 2011 WL 2434093 (overriding Ohio law); Cottonwood,
810 N.W.2d at 855 (overriding Wisconsin law).
115. See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011)
("In the event the parties proceed[ed] to arbitration, the agreement specifi[ed] that AT&T
must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; that arbitration must take place in the county in
which the customer is billed; that, for claims of $10,000 or less, the customer may choose
whether the arbitration proceeds in person, by telephone, or based only on submissions; that
either party may bring a claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitration; and that the
arbitrator may award any form of individual relief, including injunctions and presumably
punitive damages. The agreement, moreover, deni[ed] AT&T any ability to seek
reimbursement of its attorney's fees, and, in the event that a customer receive[d] an
arbitration award greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer, require[d] AT&T to pay
a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant's attorney's fees.").
116. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 59, at 490 n.150 ("[T]he arbitration agreement in
the AT&T contract with the Concepcions is unusually generous .... If the Court limits its
holding to the facts of the case, holding that California's application of the
unconscionability doctrine in this kind of arbitration setting is preempted, the question will
remain open whether other, less generous agreements, would also be preempted.").
117. See Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he
concern is not so much that customers have no effective means to vindicate their rights, but
rather that customers have insufficient incentive to do so .... But as the Supreme Court
stated in Concepcion, such unrelated policy concerns, however worthwhile, cannot
undermine the FAA." (internal citations omitted)); Brokers' Sews. Mktg. Grp. v. Cellco
P'ship, CIV.A. 10-3973 JAP, 2012 WL 1048423, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2012) ("[T]he
Plaintiffs here do not claim that it is impossible to seek their recovery in the manner
prescribed by the arbitration agreement, but only that it would be an economically irrational
decision to do so. The Supreme Court has held that this rationale for class actions cannot
override the FAA."); Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., Civil No. 12CV418 AJB (NLS),
2012 WL 1965337, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 31, 2012) (rejecting the argument that insufficient
incentive to arbitrate undermines substantive rights).
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so bad in this particular case because AT&T's agreement was so generous to
individual claimants. 118
It is possible that the inability to strike class action waivers in arbitration
agreements will encourage courts to scrutinize other provisions in arbitration
agreements more closely for unconscionability under state law. Indeed, some
courts have recently struck down arbitration agreements because they were too
favorable to businesses in light of provisions that called for paying defendant's
attorneys' fees regardless of whether the defendant prevailed in the arbitration. 119
But it will be easy enough for businesses to scrub these sorts of provisions from
their arbitration agreements over time in order to ensure that their access to class
action waivers remains unfettered.
I suppose it is also possible that state courts could dial back their "shrink-
wrap" contract law and make it more difficult for businesses to bind consumers to
contractual terms like arbitration clauses. But state courts would have to do this for
all contractual terms; they could not do this only for arbitration clauses because
that sort of discrimination against arbitration would be clearly forbidden by the
FAA. 120 I think that it is unlikely that state courts will engage in a wholesale
rewrite of their contract law to save class actions.
Finally, it is possible that Delaware could erect special state law barriers
to class action waivers in shareholder suits. For example, if Delaware decided that
corporations could not place arbitration clauses or class action waivers in corporate
bylaws or charters, there is an argument that the FAA could not preempt that
decision. This is because corporate law is traditionally the domain of the states and
there are doctrines that force courts to presume that Congress did not intend to
preempt state laws in traditional state domains. 121 On the other hand, contract law,
too, is traditionally the domain of the states, but that did not give the Supreme
Court pause in Concepcion. Thus, in the end, I remain pessimistic that state law
can slow class action waivers.
118. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
119. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig. MDL No. 2036, 685 F.3d
1269, 1282 (1lth Cir. 2012) (holding unconscionable a "provision allowing BB&T, and
only BB&T, to recover 'any loss, costs, or expenses' arising from 'any dispute' with [its
customers], regardless of the outcome of the dispute").
120. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 ("When state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule
is displaced by the FAA.").
121. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("In all pre-
emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated ... in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied,' ... we 'start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. "' (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947))).
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b. Federal Law
As I noted above, there is no federal statute that says plaintiffs have a
right to join class actions. As a result, it is going to be hard to find something in
federal law that rises to the sort of "contrary congressional command" that
American Express said would be necessary to override the FAA.'22 Nonetheless, I
explore the best possibilities below.
First, some of the statutes that give rise to class actions against businesses
explicitly permit plaintiffs to sue as a group: the ADEA, the EPA, and the Fair
Labor Standards Act.123 But the group actions provided by these statutes are so-
called opt-in "collective actions,"'" rather than Rule 23-style opt-out class
actions-which are the group actions that businesses worry most about. 125 Thus,
although I could see one arguing that these provisions create statutory rights to join
opt-in collective actions, it is harder to see them as creating statutory rights to join
Rule 23-style opt-out class actions. (Of course, Rule 23 grants access to Rule 23-
style opt-out class actions, but federal rules like Rule 23 cannot trump federal
statutes like the FAA.) 126
Second, the NLRB believes that one provision of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") actually does grant employees the right to join Rule 23-
122. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
123. The Fair Labor Standards Act explicitly provides for group actions. See 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) ("An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the
preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer.., by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated."). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act incorporates the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 ("FSLA") collective action provision into its own statute. See 29
U.S.C § 626(b) ("The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in section[] ... 216 (except for subsection (a)
thereof) ...."). Similarly, the EPA as a whole has been incorporated into the FLSA. See 29
U.S.C. § 206(d).
124. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such
action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is
filed in the court in which such action is brought.").
125. See Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview,
622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 7, 25 (2009) ("[B]usiness interests fear class
actions, especially trans-substantive opt-out class actions for money damages ....");
Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and
Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 401, 410-11 (2002)
("Insurance and business interests have signaled a major campaign to change the 'opt-out'
provisions in the class action rules to require an affirmative act to 'opt in."').
126. See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2306-07 ("Nor does congressional
approval of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 establish an entitlement to class proceedings
for the vindication of statutory rights. The Rule imposes stringent requirements for
certification that exclude most claims, and this Court has rejected the assertion that the
class-notice requirement must be dispensed with because the 'prohibitively high cost' of
compliance would 'frustrate [plaintiff's] attempt to vindicate the policies underlying the
antitrust' laws." (internal citations omitted)).
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style class actions. 12 This provision prohibits employers from interfering with the
ability of employees "to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... ,,128 When the NLRB's
interpretation was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, however, the court did not think
Congress intended the vague phrase "concerted activities" to encompass class
actions. 129 It is hard to disagree with the Fifth Circuit, if for no other reason than
the enactment of the NLRA in 1935 predated the advent of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (including Rule 23) by three years. It is true that there was a
precursor to Rule 23 in existence in 1935-Rule 38 of the Federal Rule of
Equity 30 -but neither Rule 38 nor even the 1938-version of Rule 23 operated
anything like today's class actions; the modern opt-out class action did not arise
until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were revised in 1966.''
Finally, the federal statute that is most likely to give rise to a "contrary
congressional command" is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010.132 Although the legislation does not specifically invoke
class actions, it does specifically invoke limitations on arbitration agreements: one
section empowers the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") to impose
conditions on the use of pre-dispute arbitration in consumer financial products.1
33
Under the canons whereby a more specific or more recent statute trumps a more
general or more aged one, this invocation of limitations on arbitration is surely
explicit enough to trump the FAA. Many people expect the CFPB to soon consider
regulations prohibiting class action waivers in arbitration agreements. 131 If it does
127. See In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B., no. 184, Jan. 3, 2012, at 12 ("Rule
23 may be a procedural rule, but the Section 7 right to act concertedly by invoking Rule 23,
Section 216(b), or other legal procedures is not."), rev'd, No. 12-60031, 2013 WL 6231617
(5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
129. See In re D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 12-60031, 2013 WL 6231617, at *15 (5th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2013).
130. See Fed. R. Eq. 38 (1912).
131. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARv. L. REv. 664, 670 (1979) ("The only
textual change that can be said to have had any 'substantive' effect on class action practice
is the shift from the pre-1966 requirement that nonparty class members opt in to what was
then called a 'spurious' class action to the current principle that members of a Rule 23(b)(3)
class are presumed participants and will be bound unless they exercise their privilege to opt
out of the suit.").
132. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203 (2010).
133. See 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012) ("The CFPB, by regulation, may prohibit or
impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future
dispute between the parties, if the CFPB finds that such a prohibition or imposition of
conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.").
134. See, e.g., Back to the Future: The CFPB's Arbitration Report Could Signal a
Return to the Days Before Concepcion, LOEB & LOEB LLP CLIENT ALERTS/REPORTS (Jan.
2014), http://www.loeb.com/articles-clientalertsreports-20140108-cfpbsarbitrationreport
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so and adopts them, then it might preserve some-but only some (those brought by
credit card and mortgage consumers, for example)-of the class actions against
businesses. 135
As I see it, then, there is little in either state or federal law that will stop
businesses from taking advantage of the opportunity to bind consumers,
employees, and even shareholders to class action waivers in arbitration clauses.
But the law is still not settled for shareholders, and it will take several years before
it is. In addition, there is some chance that the CFPB will protect at least credit
card and mortgage consumers from class action waivers, and a remote chance that
the NRLB's interpretation of the NLRA will protect employees.
C. Will Businesses Take Advantage of the Opportunity?
In my view, this question-whether businesses will take advantage of the
opportunity to slip arbitration clauses with class action waivers into all their
contracts-is largely a rhetorical one. Why wouldn't businesses take advantage of
this opportunity? As I noted at the outset, in many cases, these waivers are
tantamount to insulating businesses altogether from liability for the small-stakes
injuries they cause. Why wouldn't every business want such insulation? I think
every business would.
It is true that businesses might not adopt these waivers if consumers,
employees, and shareholders demanded otherwise (and were willing to vote with
their feet if businesses did not comply with their demands). But I am skeptical that
this will be the case. For a host of reasons now chronicled by behavioral
economists, people do not rationally account for unlikely future events-such as a
dispute with a merchant or their employer-when making purchases or
employment decisions.' 36
("The logical conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that the CFPB is laying the
foundations for rulemaking that will prohibit or severely limit the availability of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in consumer agreements.").
135. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 656 ("f, after careful study, the
agency were to issue regulations prohibiting the use of class action waivers in consumer
financial products, the Supreme Court's ruling in Concepcion would be upended, at least for
those contracts over which the CFPB has direct authority.").
136. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics 14 (Yale Law Sch., Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 130, 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=959177 ("One such judgment error is optimism bias, in which
individuals believe that their own probability of facing a bad outcome is lower than it
actually is."); Daniel B. Klaff, Debiasing and Bidirectional Bias: Cognitive Failure in
Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 12 (2010) ("The
application of optimism bias to the mandatory arbitration setting is relatively
straightforward: employees may underestimate the likelihood that they will experience the
kind of negative workplace event that would give rise to a dispute requiring arbitration or
litigation."). I suppose there is the possibility that a union could force an employer to stop
using class waivers, but I have never heard of a union worrying about such a term of
employment.
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It is more realistic to think that shareholders will insist that companies
forgo class waivers for securities claims. In particular, the large institutional
investors that own thousands or millions of shares may have more power and
perhaps less cognitive bias than individual investors, and recourse to class actions
may be more important to them. On the other hand, the largest institutional
investors do not need class actions to pursue securities-fraud claims against
companies-today, they often opt-out of class actions because they have enough at
stake to go it alone.'37 This actually may make institutional investors not only
indifferent to class actions but better off without them: if they sue, but smaller
shareholders do not, then smaller shareholders end up subsidizing larger ones. 138
I must admit, however, that the empirical evidence does not yet bear my
prediction out. As I said, corporations have yet to use arbitration clauses-let alone
those with class action waivers-against their shareholders; in the few instances
arbitration has been put before shareholders in proxy votes, it failed.' 39 But surely
this is most attributable to the legal uncertainty that still exists over arbitration in
the shareholder context. When this uncertainty is resolved, I expect corporations to
seek arbitration more aggressively. Indeed, there is still uncertainty about whether
corporations even need to put these clauses to a vote by shareholders. Rather,
many believe that, under Delaware law, corporations can adopt arbitration clauses
unilaterally by changing their bylaws. 140 If that question is resolved in favor of
unilateral action, then I believe corporations will seek these clauses more
aggressively still.
It is more surprising that the empirical evidence does not yet bear out a
flight to class action waivers in the consumer and employment context. I am not
aware of any empirical studies in the employment context, but, in the consumer
137. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REv. 1109,
1132 (2011) ("Given the potential intraclass conflicts, it's no surprise that plaintiffs opt out
of securities class actions. But the opt outs generally do not include those most prejudiced
by an inadequate representative-the individual investors. Instead, institutions opt out. One
2008 survey of pension funds reported that sixty percent of its respondents pursued
individual lawsuits instead of remaining in the class. Those who opted out cited various
reasons for doing so, such as maximizing their recovery, pursuing additional claims,
controlling litigation strategy and settlement, suing in a preferred (often state-court) forum,
leveraging their position to demand corporate-governance changes, and receiving settlement
funds quickly." (internal citations omitted)).
138. See David Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 57 ARiz.
L. REv. 201, 217 (2015) ("Loss of the class action device enshrines this semi-circularity
problem into our law, creating a two-tier legal system for investors-one in which, from the
same fraud (or mispriced deal), large institutions recover damages while individuals and
small institutions do not, and one in which small investors must reach farther into their
pockets to compensate large institutional losses for that fraud (or mispriced deal).").
139. See Black & Gross, supra note 98, at 9 (discussing failure of votes at Google
and Frontier Communications).
140. See Weitzel, supra note 77, at 99-100 ("An arbitration provision could also
be included in the corporation's bylaws .... ).
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context, the studies to date-despite the anecdotes to the contrary141 -do not show
these clauses have become anything near ubiquitous. For example, in 2012 the
CFPB studied the incidence of arbitration clauses and class action waivers in
consumer credit card and checking account contracts, and found that roughly only
50% of credit card users and 40% of checking account users were bound by
arbitration clauses with class action waivers. 142 The lack of ubiquity in credit card
contracts can be explained in large part by an antitrust settlement that barred many
of the largest banks from using arbitration clauses for several years. 143 The
checking account number is more puzzling.
What explains the puzzle? Scholars have theories. Professors Bo Rutledge
and Chris Drahozal, in their study of arbitration clauses in franchisor-franchisee
contracts after Concepcion (where penetration is also far less than 100%, and with
little change before and after that decision),"4 suggest two explanations in
particular: (1) there is a great deal of inertia (or "stickiness") that must be
overcome before even sophisticated businesses change their standard-form
contractual language; and (2) although businesses can benefit from class action
waivers if they use arbitration, there are corresponding costs to arbitration that may
141. See, e.g., Greg Blankinship, Ebay Wants You to Give Up Your Class Action
Rights, FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP BLOG (August 31,
2012), http://www.4classaction.com/blog/2012/08/31/ebay-wants-you-give-your-class-
action-rights ("In August, Ebay altered the terms and conditions every user 'agrees' to when
they use the site; those terms now include an arbitration clause with a class action waiver.
As written, and assuming any court upholds it, this arbitration clause appears to preclude
any future class action suits."); Mark Hachman, Microsoft's New Terms of Service to Block
Class Action Suits, PC MAGAZINE (May 25, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,2817,2404937,00.asp ("[Microsoft] has begun changing its user agreements to prevent
consumers from filing class-action lawsuits .... tak[ing] advantage of a 2011 Supreme
Court case, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion, that allows companies to settle a complaint
either privately or via small claims court, but can prevent the plaintiff from forming a class
for a class action lawsuit."); Erin Fuchs, Here's How You Can Preserve Your Right To Sue
The Pants Off PayPal, Bus. INSIDER (October 18, 2012),
http://www.businessinsider.com/paypal-arbitration-agreement-2012-10 ("But thanks to an
April 2011 Supreme Court decision, companies like PayPal can require users to resolve
their claims outside of court in 'arbitrations,' effectively banning class action lawsuits. As
of Nov. 1, PayPal is jumping on the bandwagon to require consumers to agree to
arbitration.").
142. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY
RESULTS, at 24 fig. 2, 28 fig. 3, 37 (Dec. 12, 2013), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb-arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf.
143. See id. at 22-23 n.51. These banks were Bank of America, Capital One,
Chase, and HSBC; the settlement prohibited them from using arbitration clauses in credit
card contracts between 2010 and 2014. See id.
144. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, "Sticky" Arbitration
Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses after Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV.
955, 961 (2014) ("The use of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements has increased since
Concepcion, but not dramatically, and most franchisors have not switched to
arbitration .... ").
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outweigh this benefit. ' The first theory is perfectly plausible but it also does not
undermine my prediction that businesses will eventually flock to arbitration
clauses with class action waivers. Rather, it suggests only that it may take more
time for businesses to do so. The second theory would undermine my prediction,
but I find it much less plausible. Professors Rutledge and Drahozal speculate that
businesses might not want to use arbitration because they have only limited
appellate rights in arbitration. For some businesses, the inability to appeal adverse
decisions in litigation against individuals might outweigh the benefit of insulating
themselves from class actions. 146 1 can understand businesses that do not often face
class actions coming to this conclusion (which may include the franchisors
Professors Rutledge and Drahozal examined), but I cannot understand businesses
that do often face class actions coming to this conclusion. Surely, businesses are
much more afraid of class actions lawsuits than they are individual awards
rendered by arbitrators.
Clearly, further empirical study is needed in this area. For now, it is still
difficult to say how far businesses have gone in adopting arbitration clauses with
class action waivers outside the shareholder context (where they have not yet gone
anywhere at all). I still believe, however, that the incentives associated with class
waivers in arbitration clauses overwhelmingly point in favor of adopting them, and
I still think it is only a matter of time until businesses do so.
III. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
The preceding analysis raises an obvious question: what, if anything,
should be done about all of this? I will canvass the possible answers.
One answer is to do nothing at all and let class actions meet their demise.
There are, after all, those who think class actions are socially detrimental, and
these commentators presumably would be opposed to resuscitating them. For
example, conservative commentators have for some time thought that securities-
fraud class actions serve no salutary purpose, 147 and more recently, they came to
145. See id. at 959 ("Contracts ... may be 'sticky' and resistant to change."); id.
at 975 ("[T]here are costs to using an arbitral class waiver, and these costs provide a reason
for some businesses not to use an arbitral class waiver even after Concepcion and Amex.").
146. See id. at 973-74 ("'The principal disadvantage of arbitration is the absence
of the availability of multi-layered appeal which can normally be filed to rectify erroneous
court decision, but not arbitration award' ... this cost gives franchisors a very good reason
not to use an arbitration clause, which at least reduces, if not offsets entirely, any benefit
form avoiding class actions." (quoting Martin Fern, Franchise Law Update: Protecting a
Franchisor Against the Risk of System-Wide Class Actions, http://perma.cc/4QRF-'WW3R
(foxrothschild.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014))).
147. See, e.g., Statement of Joseph A. Grundfest, Professor of Law and Bus.,
Stanford Law Sch., Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 4 (Feb.
4, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/offices/Documents/Grundfest%2002-04-08% 20Testimony.pdf ("The conclusion is
clear. The class action securities fraud litigation system is broken. It fails efficiently to deter
fraud and fails rationally to compensate those harmed by fraud. Its greatest proponents seem
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:1
the same conclusion about consumer class actions. 4 ' The debate over securities-
fraud class actions has gone on for some time, and I will not recount it here-at
least the participants in that debate are engaging the relevant questions.149 I cannot
say the same for the recent criticism leveled against consumer class actions. The
criticism comes from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 50 The Chamber hired the
Washington D.C. law firm Mayer Brown to conduct an empirical study of
consumer class actions.' 5' Law firms, of course, are accustomed to zealously
representing their clients, and Mayer Brown's study is no exception. The study
concludes that consumers do not benefit at all from consumer class actions, and the
reasoning is two-fold: (1) only a minority of class actions result in a recovery in
favor of the class because the rest are dismissed or settled before certification; and
(2) even when class actions result in a recovery, almost none of it goes to class
members because class members file claims at very low rates. 152 1 do not
understand what the first point has to do with anything-class actions are risky
endeavors and not every case will succeed. In addition, businesses can hardly cry
foul for picking off representative plaintiffs by settling with them before
certification. The second point, however, is more serious. Although the evidence is
scant, it may be true that claims rates in consumer cases are very low. If it is true, I
think things will change in the future as it becomes easier to distribute money to
people automatically,' 53 but let us assume this point is valid at least for the time
to be the class action counsel and others who profit as a consequence of the irrationally
large damage exposures generated by the current regime.").
148. See Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
supra note 15.
149. Compare, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Markets As Monitors: A Proposal to Replace
Class Actions with Exchanges As Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 928-47
(1999) ("Fraud on the market class actions are brought to compensate investors who have
bought their shares for too much, or sold them for too little, as a result of fraudulent
misstatements by the corporation .... however, compensation does little to reduce the
social costs of securities fraud-deterrence is much more important in controlling those
costs ... Because they shortchange deterrence, securities class actions are an expensive way
to reduce the social costs of fraud on the market."), with e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John
M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in
Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 323 (2010) ("The class action
device is vital to deterring securities fraud and remedying its victims, who almost never
suffer losses sufficient to justify an individual suit.").
150. See Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
supra note 15.
151. See Mayer Brown LLP, Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members? An
Empirical Analysis of Class Actions, REUTERS 1 (2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/files/2013/12/mayerbrownclassactionstudy.pdf.
152. See id. at 5 ("Over one-third of the class actions that have been resolved were
dismissed voluntarily by the named plaintiff and produced no relief for the class."); id. at 8-
9 ("Many class settlements-and virtually all settlements of consumer class actions-
produce negligible benefits for class members ... because ... relatively few class members
actually make claims ....").
153. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Robert C. Gilbert, An Empirical Look at
Compensation in Consumer Class Actions, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. (forthcoming 2015).
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being. Nonetheless, Mayer Brown's conclusion that class actions therefore do not
benefit consumers does not follow. This is because the conclusion assumes that
consumers can benefit from class actions only when they receive compensation.
This is false. Consumer class actions have never been about compensation; they
have always been about deterrence.' 54 So long as businesses pay someone for the
harm they cause, then they have proper incentives to avoid causing that harm.'55
Consumers can benefit from deterrence just as much as they can from
compensation: when businesses are adequately deterred from wrongdoing,
consumers are not cheated by businesses in the first instance. Thus, because
whatever money not going to the class in class action settlements almost always
goes to someone else-class counsel and often a charity'156 -consumers have much
to gain from class actions thanks to the deterrence class actions generate.
In fairness, the Chamber's criticism goes beyond the Mayer Brown study.
The Chamber has also argued that consumer class actions do not deter
wrongdoing.' 57 The reasoning here is that class actions are resolved without regard
to the underlying merits of the class's claim: if businesses pay out whether or not
they commit wrongdoing, the Chamber says, class actions cannot deter
wrongdoing. 58 This time the logic is sound but the underlying empirical point is
not: there is no reason to believe that class actions are resolved without regard to
the merits. The Chamber thought otherwise because no consumer class actions
ever go to trial; all of them in the Mayer Brown study that were not dismissed were
154. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U.
PA. L. REv. 2043, 2047-69 (2010) ("But small-stakes class actions serve no insurance
function. Rather, the only function they serve is deterrence."); see also Gilles & Friedman,
supra note 3, at 132-36 ("[The] primary goal in small-claims class actions is deterrence,
and that the only question we should ask with respect to any rule or reform proposal in this
area is whether it promotes or optimizes deterrence."); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The
Class as Party and Client, 73 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 913, 918 (1998) ("[T]he various joinder
devices, including the class action, [can be seen] as essentially techniques for allowing
individuals to achieve the benefits of pooling resources against a common adversary.").
155. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 154, at 2058-79 ("The utilitarian account of the
deterrence function of litigation is a familiar one: it is desirable to force those who cause
harms to pay an amount of damages that will optimally deter them from causing the harms
to begin with.").
156. See id. at 2048 (noting that "[m]any district courts" currently distribute
"class action proceeds that, for various reasons, cannot be distributed to class members" to
"charities under the so-called 'cy pres' doctrine").
157. Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
supra note 15 ("Once the class is certified, settlement virtually always follows, driven by
the transaction costs (including e-discovery) that such actions impose-which again have
little or no correlation to the underlying merits of the case. The class action thus does not
impose burdens only on businesses that engage in wrongful conduct. Instead, the burdens of
class actions are chiefly a function of who plaintiffs' lawyers choose to sue ... .
158. Id.
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settled. 159 But it is well-known that parties settle in the shadow of what they
believe would happen at trial, and, as such, cases settle somewhere around the
expected trial outcome. 160 The Chamber also notes that class actions often settle to
avoid litigation costs.161 But this is true of all litigation, and it means only that
class actions, like all lawsuits, are resolved with regard to things other than the
merits-it does not mean that they are resolved without regard to the merits. 162
I remain convinced that class actions serve a very important regulatory
function in the United States and, without them, a great deal of wrongdoing would
go undeterred. 163 This is not to say that there are not aspects of class action
litigation that should be reformed. It may very well be that certain categories of
class actions are not socially useful. I have questioned before, for example,
whether statutory damages should be recoverable in class actions because such
class actions may systematically over-deter wrongdoing.'" Moreover, I think steps
can be taken to correct settlement influences that distort settlements from expected
trial outcomes (the merits, if you will). For example, I have said before that
perhaps plaintiffs in class actions should shoulder defendants' discovery costs if
159. See id. at 45 ("In the entire data set, not one of the class actions ended in a
final judgment on the merits for the plaintiffs. And none of the class actions went to trial,
either before a judge or a jury.").
160. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979) ("Individuals in a wide variety
of contexts bargain in the shadow of the law ....").
161. Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
supra note 15 ("Settlement virtually always follows, driven by the transaction costs
(including e-discovery) that such actions impose-which again have little or no correlation
to the underlying merits of the case. The class action thus does not impose burdens only on
businesses that engage in wrongful conduct.").
162. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 401-
03 (2004) (showing that rational settlement decisions are based on litigation costs and
expected trial outcomes).
163. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 154, at 2059 ("When claims are too small to
pursue individually, aggregating them into a class action that becomes worthwhile to pursue
permits suits to go forward that would not have done so without the device. This, of course,
forces defendants to internalize more of the costs of their activities, thereby pushing
deterrence closer to the optimal level. But even when claims are worth enough that plaintiffs
would have brought them in the absence of the class action device, aggregating the claims
furthers the deterrence purpose of civil litigation by permitting plaintiffs to reap the same
economies of scale as defendants. These economies not only decrease the administrative
costs of deterring through civil litigation, but they permit the plaintiff side to match the
investments in class action litigation made by the defendant side; it is thought that this
leveling of the playing field increases the likelihood that the judgments in such cases will
reflect the actual legal harms defendants cause.").
164. See id. at 2071 ("[S]ome commentators believe that statutory-damages
claims, which do often form the basis of small-stakes class actions, were designed to
overassess damages because it was assumed that these actions would be brought only a
small fraction of the times defendants caused harm (and the possibility of class action
litigation, aggregating as it does all the parties who have been harmed by the defendant into
one action, seriously undermines this assumption).").
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the suit is lost on summary judgment in order to reduce the litigation-expense
distortion.165 I have also said that perhaps we should try class actions by sampling
several juries rather than putting everyone before one jury in order to reduce the
distortion from risk aversion.'66 But the fact that some aspects of class action
litigation should be changed, does not mean that we should jettison class actions
altogether. In my estimation, the case for standing by while class actions meet their
demise is not very compelling.
So if something should be done to save class actions, what should it be?
One possibility is to amend the FAA, and abrogate Concepcion and American
Express. This would restore the status quo ex ante. Many commentators favor this
answer, 167 and, indeed, a bill that would do this is currently pending. 16 Given the
business community's power in Washington, however, no one thinks this bill has
much of a chance in the foreseeable future.
Another possibility is to increase government deterrence of wrongdoing.
For example, Professor Gilles and Mr. Friedman have suggested that governmental
officials bring class actions on behalf of consumers, employees, and shareholders
under their parens patriae powers. 169 But, as even they acknowledge, the private
sector's enforcement resources dwarf those of the public sector. Government
officials are, therefore, likely to bring only a fraction of the suits that the private
165. See id. at 2073 ("If the problem is that plaintiffs can run up discovery tabs on
defendants, then, as other commentators have noted, the better solution may be to ask
plaintiffs to pay for the discovery they request or at least to do so if the discovery they
request does not turn up anything." (internal citations omitted)); Brian T. Fitzpatrick,
Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv 1621, 1645 (2012) ("[P]laintiffs
might be asked to pay only the defendants' discovery-related fees and expenses if they lose
their cases, or they might be asked to pay the defendants' fees and expenses only if they
lose their cases on summary judgment.").
166. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 154, at 2072-73 ([S]ome commentators have
argued that defendants overpay to settle class actions because of the risk of an outcome at
trial that could bankrupt them .... If the problem is that the prospect of a single class action
trial is too great for defendants to bear, then the better solution may be to do as many
commentators have proposed and sample several trials and average the results.").
167. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 652 ("Congress could provide that
class action waivers shall be unenforceable-at least in standard-form consumer and
employment contracts. That is the gist of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011,
which, after dying in committee both in 2007 and 2009, was reintroduced immediately after
Concepcion. But observers appear uniform in their assessment that this bill stands little
chance of passage in the current political environment.").
168. S. 878, 113th Cong. § 402 (2013); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 402 (2013)
("Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no predispute arbitration agreement shall
be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer
dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.").
169. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 623 ("Insulated from the threats
posed by class action waivers and restrictive class action standing doctrine, attorneys
general are now uniquely positioned to represent the interests of their citizens in the very
consumer, antitrust, wage-and-hour, and other cases that have long provided the staple of
private class action practice.").
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bar brings today-and thereby generate only a fraction of the deterrence.17
Professor Gilles and Mr. Friedman have a clever way around this resource
limitation, however: public officials can hire the class action bar to prosecute these
suits on contingency."'7 Although these partnerships introduce a whole host of new
controversies,' 72 I believe this is the most promising idea I have come across. Even
still, I am uncertain these partnerships could ever match the litigation activity level
of the private bar on its own. At the very least, in jurisdictions with business-
friendly attorneys general, it is unlikely that parens patriae suits would be much of
a replacement at all. After all, one of the virtues of using private attorneys general
to regulate businesses is that they cannot be captured by those businesses in the
same way public attorneys general sometimes can be.
At the end of the day, then, I remain pessimistic-pessimistic that either
the law or the market can save class actions against businesses from a premature
demise.
170. See id. at 668469 ("At the outset, we take it as a given that state AGs
generally lack the resources to take the laboring oar on many of the large-scale cases that
have traditionally been the province of the class action plaintiffs' bar. Chronically
underfunded, state AGs have typically been consigned to a supporting role in complex class
litigations. And these budgetary constraints are only getting worse in the current economic
climate. So it is unrealistic to expect state AGs to step into the breach with their own
resources." (internal citations omitted)).
171. See id. at 669 ("There is little to stop state AGs from engaging private law
firms on a contingent fee basis to pursue claims in parens patriae on behalf of injured state
residents.").
172. For example:
First, these arrangements risk converting the public offices of state
attorneys general into less-than-objective profit centers, further blurring
the distinction between public and private litigation and even running
afoul of state and federal law. Second, these arrangements may bypass
the proper budgetary processes by permitting risk-free investments by
governments-investments whose costs are borne only after a
settlement. Third, they risk bypassing the legislative process by seeking
industry-shaping behavior that legislatures have specifically
contemplated and rejected. Fourth, they risk creating the appearance of
impropriety as public officials dole out choice assignments, particularly
in 'coattail' cases following some other state's investigation, to political
patrons. That problem may be magnified by the possibility that these
arrangements will facilitate the existence of 'revolving doors' between
lucrative plaintiff practices and stints at attorney general offices.
John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action "Cops": Public
Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1441, 1462 (2005). See also David
A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of Parens
Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 315, 324-25 (2001) (noting the
problems of "loyalties divided between their private tort clients and their public clients" and
inability to "forego[] monetary claims, or some fraction of them, in return for nomnonetary
concessions"); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 631, 669-70 ([I]f improperly
implemented, this model courts 'pay-to-play' type abuses, where state officials extract
benefits for bestowing lucrative engagements upon favored members of the private bar.").
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have tried to undertake an honest assessment of the
future of class actions against businesses in light of the Supreme Court's decisions
permitting them to use class action waivers so long as they are embedded in
arbitration clauses. My assessment is a pessimistic one. Although there is not yet
solid evidence that businesses have flocked in droves to class action waivers-and
there is one big category of class action plaintiffs (shareholders) who remain
insulated from class action waivers altogether for the time being-I think there is
every reason to believe that businesses will eventually employ these waivers en
masse against consumers and employees, and that they will topple the remaining
barriers to doing so against shareholders as well. If this comes to pass, it will mean
that businesses will have all but entirely insulated themselves from class action
liability.
It is hard for me to conclude that a world without class actions will be
anything other than a world with greater corporate wrongdoing. But I am also
pessimistic that anything can be done to undo the path that has been blazed for
businesses by the Supreme Court. There is little chance of Congress undoing the
Court's decisions and the class action alternatives proposed by commentators are,
at best, half measures.
It is not often that a scholar writes an article that says things that he hopes
will be proved wrong. I'm afraid this is one of those articles.
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